Which versions of @flex-ng/filter-pipe are malicious?

The following npm versions of @flex-ng/filter-pipe are flagged malicious: 1.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @flex-ng/filter-pipe if I installed it?

@flex-ng/filter-pipe is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @flex-ng/filter-pipe — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @flex-ng/filter-pipe was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @flex-ng/filter-pipe part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @flex-ng/filter-pipe is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-009866 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @flex-ng/filter-pipe across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @flex-ng/filter-pipe (version 1.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @flex-ng/filter-pipe across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@flex-ng/filter-pipenpm

Malicious code in @flex-ng/filter-pipe (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10222

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @flex-ng/filter-pipe

What this malware does

The @flex-ng/filter-pipe package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (the @flex-ng organizational scope) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511632071262208.

On npm install, the package's preinstall script (npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js) runs examples/verify.js, which initializes the Sentry SDK against a hardcoded author-owned DSN at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511632071262208 with sendDefaultPii: true. It then calls setUserFromPublicIp() to fetch the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's trace endpoint, attaches it as the Sentry user, deliberately triggers a captured exception, and flushes the event to the author's Sentry project. The preinstall path also force-installs @sentry/node from inside the lifecycle hook to ensure the exfiltration code is reachable on a default install. The result is a one-way data flow at install time, carrying the installer's public IP and host/exception metadata to a destination chosen by the package author, with no opt-in or documentation.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0524da5220e53f9b627616e80e901415cca4df1e47078849f19b7479dd0ab0db

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @flex-ng/filter-pipe (version 1.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @flex-ng/filter-pipe across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@flex-ng/filter-pipe is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @flex-ng/filter-pipe was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @flex-ng/filter-pipe before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @flex-ng/filter-pipe on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009866

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @flex-ng/filter-pipe-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring