@fleetbo/svronpm

The package ships two heavily obfuscated JavaScript files under dist/ — postinstall.cjs and cli.cjs — using hex-mangled identifiers (_0x56260b, _0x12d644, etc.) characteristic of javascript-obfuscator output. The corresponding non-minified variants (dist/postinstall.js and dist/cli.js) combine require('child_process') with outbound POST HTTP calls at the top level of a postinstall entry point, meaning the code executes automatically on npm install and can both spawn processes on the installer's host and send data to a network endpoint. Obfuscation of a postinstall lifecycle script that has both process-spawning and HTTP-POST primitives is not consistent with any legitimate build, native-binary fetch, or telemetry pattern — legitimate postinstalls do not need to hide their control flow. The combination of automatic install-time execution, deliberate code obfuscation, and reachable child_process + outbound HTTP primitives is the fingerprint of an install-time dropper or exfiltration payload.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.