@ferudionz/web_logger_jsnpm
@ferudionz/web_logger_js is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14044) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @ferudionz/web_logger_js (npm)
What this malware does
The package ships a single obfuscator.io-style index.js with a rotated string array, RC4 key-schedule + XOR string decoder, self-defending anti-debug wrapper, and per-call proxy functions. All identifiers (the require target, the HTTP method name, and the destination URL) are reconstructed at runtime from ~130 encoded literals, hiding the actual network destination from static inspection. The sole exported function connet(x) unconditionally issues axios.get(API_BASE_URL + x) where API_BASE_URL is a URL assembled at runtime from ~13 RC4-decoded fragments. Any consumer that calls the package's public API sends its argument to a hardcoded author-controlled destination the caller did not configure. The README hint (npm install evm_account) and the name mismatch between the published package and its documented install string are consistent with an EVM/crypto-account-targeted exfiltration helper: a caller passing an account identifier, address, key material, or similar input to connet() will silently leak it to the obfuscated endpoint. The concealment of the destination behind RC4 decoding and anti-debug wrapping rules out an inadvertent, documented service call.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @ferudionz/web_logger_js (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @ferudionz/web_logger_js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@ferudionz/web_logger_js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @ferudionz/web_logger_js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @ferudionz/web_logger_js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ferudionz/web_logger_js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.