Which versions of @fazzcodestudio/wa-web are malicious?

The following npm versions of @fazzcodestudio/wa-web are flagged malicious: 0.3.0, 0.3.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @fazzcodestudio/wa-web if I installed it?

@fazzcodestudio/wa-web is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @fazzcodestudio/wa-web — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @fazzcodestudio/wa-web was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is @fazzcodestudio/wa-web part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @fazzcodestudio/wa-web is associated with the GHSA-69w8-wg2c-rm67 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @fazzcodestudio/wa-web across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @fazzcodestudio/wa-web (2 malicious versions).

Malicious package

@fazzcodestudio/wa-webnpm

Advisory published Oct 12, 2026Updated Oct 12, 2026

@fazzcodestudio/wa-web is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17441) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.3.0, 0.3.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @fazzcodestudio/wa-web (npm)

MAL-2026-17441

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @fazzcodestudio/wa-web

What this malware does

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.

package/lib/Defaults/index.js lines 79-81 ship the defaults autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect: true, autoFollowNewsletterDelayMs: 90000 and autoFollowNewsletterJid: "120363400911374213@newsletter" (a plain string literal). package/lib/Socket/index.js line 11 calls triggerAutoFollow (package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js line 428) on every socket, which waits 90 seconds after the connection opens and runs runAutoFollow (line 66), sending a raw w:mex IQ with query_id: QueryIds.FOLLOW (line 96) for that JID, retrying up to three times. The follow is on by default and the README does not mention it; a user would have to find and set the undocumented autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect: false to avoid it. In 0.3.0 the fallback constant at newsletter.js line 11 is 120363418617842480@newsletter, but the shipped default config value 120363400911374213@newsletter takes precedence in both versions.

Line numbers refer to version 0.3.1; the same code is present in every published version listed under affected.

Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in engine-requirements.js), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the publisher's channel subscribers.

SHA-256 of the published npm tarball(s): 0.3.0: e274c9056c7891ebcfc175798a97a1302b93294ba3877f7c03ef6bc19753e0e1; 0.3.1: 3ae57ea60d9da75b5653743ea4fdc5f74e2de718078a5ac735f3d8b22b260136.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.3.00.3.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

fa126fa784d7efe15b5d44a2917a7bad594192298074878aacd88d43780dee0f

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @fazzcodestudio/wa-web (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@fazzcodestudio/wa-web is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @fazzcodestudio/wa-web was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @fazzcodestudio/wa-web on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.3.0, 0.3.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-69w8-wg2c-rm67

References

Credits

Rising Sun Solutions LLC · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @fazzcodestudio/wa-web-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database