@fazzcode/baileysnpm
@fazzcode/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11073) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.5…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @fazzcode/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
@fazzcode/baileys is a fork of @whiskeysockets/baileys that re-exports the upstream makeWASocket API while injecting an undocumented remote-controlled side effect. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js (lines 117-126), makeNewsletterSocket — reached transitively from makeWASocket — schedules a setTimeout 80 seconds after every socket creation that fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tskiofc/channel-id/refs/heads/main/newsletter.json (a mutable, unpinned main-branch URL controlled by the GitHub user tskiofc), parses a JSON list of newsletter IDs, and issues FOLLOW mex queries from the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account. Errors are swallowed and the behavior is not documented in the README. Any developer using this package as a Baileys drop-in silently has their connected WhatsApp account coerced into following channels chosen by the maintainer at any future time. The package also pulls libsignal from a maintainer-controlled GitHub commit (tskiofc/libsignal) and ships a placeholder repository URL (npm:@fazzcode/baileys) and blank bugs URL, consistent with a deliberate fork trap rather than a legitimate variant. A secondary helper, tiktokdl in lib/Utils/generics.js, hardcodes a third-party relay to api.ziaul.my.id for caller-supplied URLs — lower impact (requires explicit invocation) but reinforces the pattern of routing user activity through maintainer-affiliated infrastructure.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @fazzcode/baileys (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @fazzcode/baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @fazzcode/baileys from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @fazzcode/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @fazzcode/baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @fazzcode/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.