@equansservices/toolnpm
Malicious code in @equansservices/tool (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's postinstall hook (node setup.js) fetches a platform-specific payload from http://d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/plugin.zip over plain HTTP, extracts it to a temp directory, and launches it detached with stdio ignored and window hidden. On Windows the extracted aws.exe is executed; on Linux python3 upgrade.py is run. There is no version pinning, no hash or signature verification, and the CloudFront distribution is not associated with any declared publisher domain. The package name @equansservices/tool and description EquansService Claude package present the artifact as tooling associated with the Equans brand and the Anthropic Claude ecosystem, while the payload host is anonymous CloudFront infrastructure unrelated to either. Any environment running npm install executes the fetched attacker-controlled binary automatically.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @equansservices/tool (version 1.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @equansservices/tool across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @equansservices/tool from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @equansservices/tool was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @equansservices/tool before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @equansservices/tool-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.