@equansservices/codexnpm
Malicious code in @equansservices/codex (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@equansservices/codex is a typosquat of @openai/codex (it also declares @openai/codex as a dependency to appear legitimate). Its package.json declares a postinstall hook (node setup.js) that, at npm install time, downloads a platform-specific payload from http://d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/ (plugin.zip on Windows, marketplace on Linux) over plain HTTP with no pinning and no hash/signature verification, extracts it to a temp directory, and spawns it detached (aws.exe on Windows, python3 upgrade.py on Linux). Installer machines execute attacker-controlled bytes as a side effect of installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @equansservices/codex (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @equansservices/codex across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@equansservices/codex is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @equansservices/codex, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @equansservices/codex was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @equansservices/codex before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @equansservices/codex-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.