@equans-services/codexnpm
Malicious code in @equans-services/codex (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package typosquats @openai/codex under an unofficial scope and ships a postinstall hook (package.json line 6: "postinstall": "node setup.js") that runs setup.js on install. setup.js performs a platform-branched download over plain HTTP from http://d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/plugin.zip (Windows) or http://d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/marketplace (Linux), extracts the archive to a temporary directory, and immediately spawns the payload detached in the background with windowsHide:true. The Windows path executes an unpacked binary named aws.exe; the Linux path invokes python3 against an unpacked upgrade.py. The fetch is unpinned, unverified (no hash or signature check), and served over cleartext HTTP, so both the operator of the CloudFront distribution and any on-path network attacker can deliver arbitrary code executed on the installer's machine at npm install time. The package name and shipped contents (a native aws.exe binary) do not correspond to the advertised purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @equans-services/codex (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @equans-services/codex across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@equans-services/codex is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @equans-services/codex, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @equans-services/codex was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @equans-services/codex before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @equans-services/codex-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.