@emcd-vue/loansnpm
Malicious code in @emcd-vue/loans (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Part of a coordinated multi-package supply-chain attack impersonating EMCD (emcd.io), a legitimate Russian cryptocurrency exchange and mining pool. The attacker registered the @emcd-vue npm scope to distribute multiple malicious packages posing as internal tooling. This package was published 90 seconds after sibling package @emcd-vue/auth on 2026-06-01 by the same anonymous account ([email protected]).
Confirmed to use identical infrastructure and dropper logic as @emcd-vue/auth: downloads a platform-specific second-stage payload from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{platform} using X-Secret: l95HdDaz3kQx1Zsg3WxH6HvKANf51RY1, writes it to ~/.emcd-vue_init.js (dot-prefixed hidden file), and executes it as a detached, unref'd process that persists after npm exits. Beacons installation metadata to https://oob.moika.tech/report on completion.
On npm install, the declared postinstall script scripts/postinstall.js executes a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) bundle that collects host identifiers (hostname, username, homedir), the full process.env (with Windows-specific keys such as USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA), the tail of shell history, and the contents of a hardcoded list of files under the user's home directory that the package itself never created. The collected object is transmitted to a remote endpoint over HTTP(S) and additionally over a covert DNS channel: the payload is base32-encoded into subdomain labels and issued as dns.Resolver().resolveTxt(...) queries in chunks, bypassing HTTP egress filters. Endpoint hostnames, header names, and API strings are reconstructed at runtime via a shuffled string array with RC4/XOR decoders. Before exfiltrating, the script checks process.argv and NODE_OPTIONS for debugger indicators and performs a timing check to detect sandboxes, skipping the exfil if analysis instrumentation is detected. The package also exhibits dependency-confusion shape: metadata references an internal-looking scope and registry (@emcd-vue, npm.emcd-vue.io, github.emcd-vue.io) while being published to the public npm registry, and dist/index.js re-exports a ../src/index.js that is absent from the tarball, so the package has no functional library surface — the postinstall is its only executable code.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @emcd-vue/loans (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @emcd-vue/loans across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@emcd-vue/loans is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @emcd-vue/loans was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @emcd-vue/loans before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @emcd-vue/loans-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.