@dsft/ft-utilsnpm
Malicious code in @dsft/ft-utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package is a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept squatting on the @dsft/ scope. Its package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js, which reads the installer's INIT_CWD environment variable (the consumer's project directory), derives the project's basename, and POSTs it together with a package identifier and timestamp to a hardcoded third-party URL (https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/f9543624-20d8-465b-a026-d01872b93933). The package provides no library functionality matching its name; the install-time beacon is its sole behavior, and the package self-describes as a 'Security PoC for Bug Bounty.' Any npm install of this package automatically discloses the installing project's directory name and confirms the host's environment to the operator of the callback endpoint, without consent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @dsft/ft-utils (version 1.5.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @dsft/ft-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@dsft/ft-utils is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @dsft/ft-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @dsft/ft-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @dsft/ft-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.