@dsft/ft-elementnpm
Malicious code in @dsft/ft-element (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's preinstall hook (preinstall: node index.js in package.json) executes index.js, which reads process.env.INIT_CWD, derives the installing project's directory name via path.basename(), and POSTs a JSON beacon {pkg, timestamp, transport, project} to a hardcoded callback URL https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/e51c2215-3fa8-48f1-ad64-1cf792e0cccc. The package is published under the @dsft scope and self-describes as a dependency-confusion PoC (description: Security PoC for Bug Bounty; index.js comment: Harmless dependency confusion PoC). Any build pipeline that expects a private @dsft/ft-element package and resolves to this public version will silently leak the project's directory name — which typically equals the private package/repo name — to a third-party endpoint, confirming a successful dependency-confusion takeover target. Installers receive no disclosure or consent. Although the author frames this as harmless research, the mechanism (unconditional install-time beacon containing host-identifying context to an attacker-controlled URL) is a supply-chain attack against any installer the scope collision affects.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @dsft/ft-element (version 2.5.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @dsft/ft-element across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@dsft/ft-element establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @dsft/ft-element was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @dsft/ft-element before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @dsft/ft-element-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.