@dsft/ft-elementnpm

On npm install, the package's preinstall hook (preinstall: node index.js in package.json) executes index.js, which reads process.env.INIT_CWD, derives the installing project's directory name via path.basename(), and POSTs a JSON beacon {pkg, timestamp, transport, project} to a hardcoded callback URL https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/e51c2215-3fa8-48f1-ad64-1cf792e0cccc. The package is published under the @dsft scope and self-describes as a dependency-confusion PoC (description: Security PoC for Bug Bounty; index.js comment: Harmless dependency confusion PoC). Any build pipeline that expects a private @dsft/ft-element package and resolves to this public version will silently leak the project's directory name — which typically equals the private package/repo name — to a third-party endpoint, confirming a successful dependency-confusion takeover target. Installers receive no disclosure or consent. Although the author frames this as harmless research, the mechanism (unconditional install-time beacon containing host-identifying context to an attacker-controlled URL) is a supply-chain attack against any installer the scope collision affects.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.