@druids/uinpm
Malicious code in @druids/ui (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's package.json declares a dependency ltidisafe resolved not from the npm registry but as a direct tarball URL: https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.6.2.tgz. On npm install, npm will fetch and install that tarball, executing whatever lifecycle scripts and code it contains on the installer's machine with no audit trail in this package's published source. Several corroborating signals indicate this is dependency-confusion / namespace-abuse tooling rather than a legitimate UI library: the GCS bucket path literally contains the string depenconf (a common shorthand for dependency-confusion); the package version is 99.9.1, the high-version-squat pattern used to outrank a private internal package of the same name; package metadata (author, description) is empty; and the package's own index.js is near-empty, providing no library functionality consistent with the @druids/ui name. The installer-side harm is the silent inclusion of an attacker-controlled, registry-unaudited transitive into the dependency tree.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @druids/ui (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @druids/ui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @druids/ui from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @druids/ui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @druids/ui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @druids/ui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.