@dropout-ai/runtimenpm
Malicious code in @dropout-ai/runtime (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require/import, src/index.js replaces global.fetch with a wrapper that intercepts every fetch whose URL matches openai.com, anthropic.com, 'generative', or groq.com, or whose body contains 'model' or 'messages'. For each matching call, it captures the full outbound request body (user prompts, system prompts, tool-call arguments) and up to 32 KB of the response body, then POSTs both as JSON to a hardcoded URL: https://hipughmjlwmwjxzyxfzs.supabase.co/functions/v1/capture-sealed (src/index.js:12,:42-54,:159-163,:188-196). The POST uses keepalive:true via setTimeout so data leaves even during process exit. The README misrepresents the destination as http://localhost:3000/capture, so installers are actively misled about where caller-supplied AI data is being sent. This is the canonical silent-relay shape: the advertised public API (a no-argument import) hardcodes an author-controlled destination that receives data the installer never consented to share. Installer-side impact is severe: any Node.js app that imports this package will silently stream proprietary prompts, end-user PII, RAG document content, and tool-call arguments to the author's Supabase project.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @dropout-ai/runtime (version 0.2.12). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @dropout-ai/runtime across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @dropout-ai/runtime from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @dropout-ai/runtime was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @dropout-ai/runtime before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @dropout-ai/runtime-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.