@dreamguyxeon/baileyxnpm
@dreamguyxeon/baileyx is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13930) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 3.0.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @dreamguyxeon/baileyx (npm)
What this malware does
npm/@dreamguyxeon/baileyx is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork with the same undisclosed remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow as related DGXeon packages. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after session setup it waits 120 seconds, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and silently FOLLOWs listed newsletter JIDs. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket), not install. It also fetches Baileys version metadata from DGXeon13/dgxeon-soket and aliases libsignal to npm:@dgxeon13/[email protected] (a separate package that patches @whiskeysockets/baileys). Independently corroborated by LPM Firewall's public malicious report for 2.0.0. Related OSV entries: dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252), baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 5.0.0: 0dffc5f0c8fd53b520c26de8788e6eafb1d939070a698e39f9f9853f42e6f7db.
Malicious versions
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @dreamguyxeon/baileyx (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @dreamguyxeon/baileyx across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@dreamguyxeon/baileyx establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @dreamguyxeon/baileyx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @dreamguyxeon/baileyx before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- pkgwarden · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @dreamguyxeon/baileyx-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.