@doaction/wasm-loadernpm
Malicious code in @doaction/wasm-loader (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name and description advertise a 'WASM loader,' but the tarball ships no WebAssembly code. Instead, package.json declares "preinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js", and scripts/preinstall.js unconditionally require()s @doaction/shared/bin/preinstall.js, which the package self-documents as shipping environment telemetry to a Datadog intake on every npm install. This auto-fires for every installer with no opt-in or disclosure in the README, and the destination is hardcoded outside the installer's control. Additionally, src/index.js exports collectEnv and sendToDatadog as part of the public module surface (module.exports = { collectEnv, sendToDatadog, reportWasmEnv, WASM_WHITELIST }), giving any caller a primitive to send arbitrary process.env contents to the same Datadog endpoint, bypassing the advertised WASM_WHITELIST path. The combination of a misleading package identity (wasm loader with no wasm), a 9.9.9 dependency-confusion-shaped version, a scoped org, and install-time + import-time exfiltration primitives to a single hardcoded third-party intake constitutes installer-side data exfiltration.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/wasm-loader (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/wasm-loader across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@doaction/wasm-loader is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/wasm-loader was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/wasm-loader before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @doaction/wasm-loader-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.