@doaction/typesnpm
Malicious code in @doaction/types (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@doaction/[email protected] is a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal @doaction scope. The package.json declares "version": "99.99.99" and pins "@doaction/shared": "^99.99.99" — the canonical version-flooding pattern designed to beat any private-registry copy of the same scoped name. The preinstall lifecycle hook ("preinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js") runs automatically on npm install and require()s @doaction/shared/bin/preinstall.js; src/index.js wires reportEnvToDatadog from @doaction/shared, whose declared purpose is to collect environment variables and POST them to Datadog. The installer never opts in. The require() is wrapped in a try/catch that swallows everything except MODULE_NOT_FOUND, suppressing exfil errors in CI logs. The combination — internal-scope name confusion, 99.99.99 version flood, automatic preinstall execution, env-var shipment via a sibling package, and silenced error output — is the textbook dependency-confusion exfiltration shape and produces direct attacker benefit (capture of internal env vars, which routinely include CI tokens, cloud credentials, and registry auth).
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/types (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/types across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@doaction/types is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/types was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/types before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @doaction/types-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.