@doaction/storagenpm
Malicious code in @doaction/storage (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package @doaction/[email protected] is shaped as a dependency-confusion attack against the private-looking @doaction scope. The 99.99.99 sentinel version is the canonical pattern used to outrank any legitimate internal version when an installer's resolver reaches the public npm registry. On npm install, the preinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) auto-executes and require()s @doaction/shared/bin/postinstall.js, which is pulled as a ^99.99.99 dependency. The package's stated purpose and exports (collectEnv, sendToDatadog, reportEnvToDatadog in src/index.js) advertise harvesting environment variables and shipping them to a Datadog intake. Because the actual collection and transmission code lives in the sibling @doaction/shared package and not in this tarball, the data set being exfiltrated cannot be audited against any README whitelist — installers have no way to know which env vars (potentially including credentials, tokens, CI secrets) actually leave the host. The combination of private-scope squat + sentinel version + auto-executing preinstall + env-var collection delegated to an opaque sibling is a textbook dependency-confusion exfiltration probe.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/storage (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/storage across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@doaction/storage is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/storage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/storage before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @doaction/storage-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.