@doaction/mapstorenpm
Malicious code in @doaction/mapstore (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@doaction/[email protected] is published to the public npm registry under a sentinel-high version (99.99.99) with a pinned @doaction/shared: ^99.99.99 dependency — the canonical shape of a dependency-confusion attack designed to be resolved over a private internal @doaction/* package. package.json declares "preinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js", which require()s @doaction/shared/bin/postinstall.js; a sibling preinstall.js wrapper similarly require()s @doaction/shared/bin/preinstall.js. The wrappers self-describe as 'Triggers safe environment telemetry on npm install' and the package's main src/index.js documents the purpose as collecting environment variables and sending them to Datadog. Both wrappers catch and silently swallow non-MODULE_NOT_FOUND errors so the install completes regardless of telemetry success/failure, minimizing installer visibility. The exfiltration runs unconditionally at npm install time with no user opt-in. Installer harm: CI/build environment variables (which routinely include cloud credentials, registry tokens, and CI secrets) are transmitted to a third-party endpoint whenever a build system mistakenly resolves this public package over the intended internal one.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/mapstore (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/mapstore across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@doaction/mapstore is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/mapstore was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/mapstore before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @doaction/mapstore-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.