Which versions of @doaction/example are malicious?

The following npm versions of @doaction/example are flagged malicious: 9.9.9, 99.99.99. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @doaction/example if I installed it?

Remove @doaction/example from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed @doaction/example — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @doaction/example was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @doaction/example part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @doaction/example is associated with the GHSA-w4g4-r5qj-rj58, IN-MAL-2026-008108, IN-MAL-2026-009402 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @doaction/example across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/example (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/example across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@doaction/examplenpm

Malicious code in @doaction/example (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5371

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @doaction/example

What this malware does

@doaction/[email protected] is a scoped npm package whose package.json self-describes as 'Example package with Datadog environment telemetry for internal testing' and pins @doaction/shared at ^99.99.99. On install, scripts/preinstall.js delegates execution to @doaction/shared/bin/preinstall.js via require('@doaction/shared/bin/preinstall.js'). The shared dependency's preinstall code is not present in this tarball and its actual behavior cannot be confirmed from the contents shipped here. The library API reportExampleEnv (src/index.js) is opt-in: callers must explicitly supply a Datadog API key and invoke the function, and the documented whitelist is limited to EXAMPLE_MODE and EXAMPLE_DEBUG. The installer-facing risk depends entirely on what @doaction/shared's preinstall and collectEnv actually do — those bytes need to be reviewed before a final disposition. The 99.99.99 version pattern combined with the scoped name is also consistent with a dependency-confusion shape against an internal @doaction namespace, which warrants human assessment.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

9.9.999.99.99

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

5632bd1a9818c4a4af54e5297d40c10279d83e702ee5f59fa9bd50c52a33e0bd

9e2df92bb520aefba5bcfa6e3e88b4cbd7da3ea27b121380c17615bcfbab1ade

76081a2c1ed86add4a6eb5780ada3678d542bc94634c8b17aab51edd79dbebaa

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/example (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/example across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @doaction/example from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/example was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/example before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @doaction/example on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 9.9.9, 99.99.99 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-w4g4-r5qj-rj58IN-MAL-2026-008108IN-MAL-2026-009402

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @doaction/example-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring