@doaction/eventemitternpm
Malicious code in @doaction/eventemitter (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package is a thin shim. package.json declares preinstall: node scripts/postinstall.js, which require()s @doaction/shared/bin/preinstall.js — meaning the install-time behavior is sourced from a sibling package that is not present in this tarball. src/index.js re-exports collectEnv, sendToDatadog, and reportEnvToDatadog from @doaction/shared and offers a reportEventEnv helper that posts an EVENT_* env subset to Datadog using a caller-supplied API key (gated on explicit user invocation, not a silent relay in this package itself). Several attributes are characteristic of dependency-confusion staging: a 99.99.99 version (well above any plausible real release), an 'internal testing' description, and a scope (@doaction) that may shadow an internal namespace. The actual install-time impact depends entirely on @doaction/shared's implementation of collectEnv and the preinstall script, which cannot be confirmed from this tarball alone. Routing for human review to confirm whether @doaction/shared is attacker-controlled (dependency-confusion attack) and to assess the env-collection behavior it actually performs at install time.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/eventemitter (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/eventemitter across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @doaction/eventemitter from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/eventemitter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/eventemitter before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @doaction/eventemitter-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.