@doaction/authnpm
@doaction/auth is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5369) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 9.9.9, 99.99.99). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @doaction/auth (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js", which require()s '@doaction/shared/bin/postinstall.js'. The package's stated purpose is to transmit environment data to Datadog (api.datadoghq.com) at install time. The actual fetch/transmit logic lives in the @doaction/shared dependency, not in this tarball, so the runtime behavior at install time depends on what that sibling package executes when loaded. The library API src/index.js exports reportAuthEnv()/reportEnvToDatadog() with an auth-related env whitelist (AUTH_PROVIDER, OAUTH_ENABLED, SSO_ENABLED, etc.); that path requires a caller-supplied ddApiKey and is opt-in. Additionally, package.json wires the preinstall lifecycle to a file named scripts/postinstall.js while an unused scripts/preinstall.js also ships in the tarball — a naming inversion that reduces reviewer signal. The destination is a known commercial observability SaaS rather than attacker infrastructure, and the package's advertised purpose is exactly this telemetry, so this is undisclosed-by-default telemetry shape (consent-violating at install time, breaks air-gapped installs, no opt-out) rather than credential exfiltration to attacker-controlled hosts. Routing to human review to assess the sibling package's actual install-time payload and whether disclosure/opt-out should be required.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @doaction/auth (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @doaction/auth across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@doaction/auth is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @doaction/auth was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @doaction/auth before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @doaction/auth-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.