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Malicious package

@djessicatony/folk-mcp-canarynpm

Malicious code in @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4382
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary

What this malware does

index.js contains a beacon-style exfiltration primitive: a fetch() POST at line 60-61 sends process.env data (read at lines 30 and 34) to a hardcoded destination URL (https://REPLACE-WITH-YOUR-BEACON.example, observed at line 24). The file also references 'ping' command invocations (lines 3, 83, 92) consistent with host reconnaissance. The destination URL is a placeholder template string ('REPLACE-WITH-YOUR-BEACON.example'), indicating this is either a published-by-mistake attack template or a proof-of-concept beacon stub — either way the structural shape (env-var read + POST to hardcoded non-publisher endpoint) is an installer-data exfiltration pattern with no legitimate purpose. Package name (under @djessicatony scope, suffix 'canary', version 0.0.1) and the placeholder C2 are consistent with throwaway test-publish of malicious tooling.

Malicious versions

1 flagged
0.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

a504172fe0e456bd96cf7b4f9a6b6dda65dee7bd573833bbf5963b0be7a05ae8

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003664

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring
@djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-4382 | O3 Security