Which versions of @dexwilt/node-fetch are malicious?

The following npm versions of @dexwilt/node-fetch are flagged malicious: 2.7.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @dexwilt/node-fetch if I installed it?

@dexwilt/node-fetch is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @dexwilt/node-fetch, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed @dexwilt/node-fetch — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @dexwilt/node-fetch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @dexwilt/node-fetch part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @dexwilt/node-fetch is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010977 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @dexwilt/node-fetch across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @dexwilt/node-fetch (version 2.7.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @dexwilt/node-fetch across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@dexwilt/node-fetchnpm

@dexwilt/node-fetch is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11203) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 2.7.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @dexwilt/node-fetch (npm)

MAL-2026-11203

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @dexwilt/node-fetch

What this malware does

The @dexwilt/node-fetch package impersonates the legitimate node-fetch project: its package metadata copies the upstream repository, author, and homepage while publishing under an unrelated scope. Its CommonJS entry point lib/index.js contains the expected node-fetch implementation followed by approximately 94 KB of additional RC4/Base64-obfuscated code. The ESM builds do not contain this appended payload.

Agent-assisted deobfuscation of the appended payload recovered a cross-platform download and execution chain. It retrieves a remote binary from an encrypted endpoint, records and verifies the downloaded file's SHA-256 value, and starts the binary with detached, hidden-window, and ignored-stdio options before unreferencing the child process. The original obfuscated source independently exposes the detached, windowsHide, stdio, environment, working-directory, size, SHA-256, and download timestamp fields used by this chain. Loading the package's declared main entry point therefore executes a concealed remote payload loader embedded after otherwise legitimate node-fetch code.

@dexwilt/node-fetch impersonates the popular node-fetch package under a personal scope. Its main entrypoint (lib/index.js, lib/index.mjs, lib/index.es.js) ships the legitimate node-fetch v2 source with two appended, heavily obfuscated self-executing IIFEs that contain RC4+base64 string-array decoders reconstructing calls to https.request, fs.writeFileSync, fs.chmodSync, and child_process.spawn. Execution is gated on process.env.npm_config_user_agent — set by npm/yarn/pnpm during install but absent in plain node/REPL runs — so the payload only fires inside real installs while staying dormant during casual inspection. When triggered, the code re-spawns the current Node process detached with stdio ignored, downloads a remote binary over HTTP(S), writes it to a temp directory, chmods it 0o755, and execs it detached with windowsHide and unref(). Two independent dropper IIFEs are present in the same file, each with its own decoder and download→write→spawn pipeline, increasing reliability. Any developer or build pipeline that requires or installs this package automatically runs attacker-controlled code with persistence beyond the npm process.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.7.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

416d6cd82361af6b046d895f23d5e82a82db236a104726914595c21288e33ed0

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @dexwilt/node-fetch (version 2.7.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @dexwilt/node-fetch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@dexwilt/node-fetch is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @dexwilt/node-fetch, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @dexwilt/node-fetch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @dexwilt/node-fetch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @dexwilt/node-fetch on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.7.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010977

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
YoSheep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @dexwilt/node-fetch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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