Which versions of @devcarron/clob are malicious?

The following npm versions of @devcarron/clob are flagged malicious: 2.73.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @devcarron/clob if I installed it?

@devcarron/clob establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed @devcarron/clob — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @devcarron/clob was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @devcarron/clob part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @devcarron/clob is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004635 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @devcarron/clob across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @devcarron/clob (version 2.73.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @devcarron/clob across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@devcarron/clobnpm

Malicious code in @devcarron/clob (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4347

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @devcarron/clob

What this malware does

A campaign of npm packages sharing a common dropper (clob.js) that downloads and persistently installs a Windows executable from IPFS on postinstall. The dropper fetches the binary from IPFS CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa via multiple public gateways (Pinata, Cloudflare, ipfs.io), drops it to %LOCALAPPDATA%, registers Windows Registry persistence under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run using a hidden VBScript wrapper (window style 0, no taskbar entry), launches the payload immediately, and reports the victim's public IP address to a hardcoded C2 server via HTTP POST. macOS and Linux stubs are present but not yet configured. Developer artifacts bundled in config/meta_data.json leak the attacker's build path: E:\getting IP and check list\clob-downloader\.

@devcarron/clob is a scoped package identical in behavior to clob.api and likely published by the same actor as a distribution variant. It bundles clob2.0.exe (≈4 MB) directly in the tarball and also fetches from IPFS. Its postinstall script runs clob.js, which drops the executable to %LOCALAPPDATA%\clob2.0.exe. The C2 beacon transmits the victim's public IP to http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls.

@devcarron/clob ships a malicious postinstall dropper. package.json declares postinstall: node clob.js, which on npm install downloads an opaque Windows executable (clob2.0.exe) from IPFS via gateways including violet-tricky-quelea-562.mypinata.cloud, cloudflare-ipfs.com, and gateway.pinata.cloud (CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa), writes it under %LOCALAPPDATA%, generates a VBS launcher, and registers HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to silently launch the binary via wscript.exe with windowsHide. Equivalent persistence is installed on macOS via ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clob.agent.plist + launchctl load, and on Linux via ~/.config/autostart/clob.desktop. clob.js then resolves the installer's public IP through api.ipify.org and POSTs it to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls over plain HTTP — an install-time beacon notifying the operator of each successful infection. The tarball additionally ships a 4 MB Windows PE clob2.0.exe at the root, and README.md is copied verbatim from @img/sharp-win32-x64 (Prebuilt sharp for use with Windows x64) to disguise the package's true purpose. None of these behaviors relate to any legitimate library function: no source code, no advertised API, no relation to libvips/sharp.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.73.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

7a672e1412ca3d2af83bcf7772d7cf6b1803b8987a43e4a2abc359112f34aea1

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @devcarron/clob (version 2.73.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @devcarron/clob across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@devcarron/clob establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @devcarron/clob was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @devcarron/clob before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @devcarron/clob on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.73.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004635

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @devcarron/clob-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring