@dervix/wsnpm

Package @dervix/ws impersonates the popular ws WebSocket library — package.json copies the legitimate ws project's homepage (https://github.com/websockets/ws), repository, and author metadata while publishing under an unrelated scope. lib/websocket.js appends ~130KB of heavily obfuscated code after the genuine socketOnError function; this payload executes at require() time via index.js. On import the payload (1) re-spawns the current Node process detached with stdio:'ignore' and windowsHide:true, gated by an obfuscated marker env var so the parent returns cleanly while a daemonized child continues; (2) constructs an AES-256 key by XOR-combining four hardcoded hex Buffers; (3) issues an HTTPS GET (following 3xx redirects) to an encrypted-in-source URL, streams the response to a file under os.tmpdir(), and decrypts it via createDecipheriv; (4) fs.chmodSync(path, 0o755) and child_process.spawn(path,...) with detached:true then unref()s it. Dynamic import('child_process') / import('path') is used to defeat static require audits, and an inspector.url() check short-circuits execution when a debugger is attached. There is no signature verification, no version pinning, and the destination URL is RC4-decoded at runtime so it cannot be inspected statically. Combined with the cloned ws metadata, this is a deliberate typosquat dropper that lands and executes attacker-controlled binary code on any machine that installs and imports the package.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.