@depup/astronpm
@depup/astro is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13622) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 7.1.3-depup.2, 7.2.0-depup.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @depup/astro (npm)
What this malware does
This package is published under the @depup scope but sets author to 'withastro' and repository to github.com/withastro/astro, framing itself as a routine dependency-bump of the upstream astro framework. Its package.json systematically replaces well-known astro dependencies with same-shape lookalike names controlled by different maintainers, including picocolors→piccolore (^0.1.3), debug→obug (^2.1.4), and @astrojs/markdown-remark→@astrojs/markdown-satteri (0.3.5), alongside other atypical names such as tinyclip, am-i-vibing, and fontace. The shipped source has been mass-rewritten to import from the lookalikes (e.g., import colors from "piccolore" in place of picocolors), so a normal npm install and subsequent build resolves and executes code from those lookalike packages rather than the genuine upstream dependencies. The advertised version numbers (astro 7.2.0, vite 8, esbuild 0.28, zod 4) do not correspond to real upstream releases, and README keywords like 'security', 'latest', and 'patched' are used to normalize the substitutions as a maintenance update.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @depup/astro (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @depup/astro across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@depup/astro is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @depup/astro, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @depup/astro was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @depup/astro before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @depup/astro-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.