Which versions of @demica/shared are malicious?

The following npm versions of @demica/shared are flagged malicious: 99.99.99, 99.99.100. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @demica/shared if I installed it?

@demica/shared is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @demica/shared — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @demica/shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @demica/shared part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @demica/shared is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005010, IN-MAL-2026-008112 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @demica/shared across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @demica/shared (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @demica/shared across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@demica/sharednpm

Malicious code in @demica/shared (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5351

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @demica/shared

What this malware does

Note: This report is updated by a verification record

Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/shared at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.

On install, the package's postinstall hook (node canary.js postinstall per package.json) issues an unconditional HTTP GET to bare IP 157.230.17.236:80 at path /dc with query params containing the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. No environment variables, filesystem contents, or credentials are read or transmitted; the payload is limited to package metadata. The README describes this as an authorized dependency-confusion canary against the @demica scope. The fact-of-install ping is otherwise benign, but it performs unconsented outbound network at install time, the destination is a bare IP over cleartext HTTP with no authentication or pinning, and the same postinstall hook is a position from which a future republish could deliver arbitrary payloads. Routing to human review so the @demica organization can confirm the canary is theirs and that the destination IP is operator-controlled.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

99.99.9999.99.100

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

dfc020ab633bac129072df0d74deea8e0a2e118b43dbebf01ba9bbf2b13b6e76

becb5aca9f28fbd99a4f45ed70489960879ba81cfbd2071648c98cf5e867d8f9

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @demica/shared (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @demica/shared across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@demica/shared is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @demica/shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @demica/shared before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @demica/shared on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 99.99.99, 99.99.100 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005010IN-MAL-2026-008112

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @demica/shared-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring