Which versions of @demica/shared are malicious?

The following npm versions of @demica/shared are flagged malicious: 99.99.100. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @demica/shared if I installed it?

@demica/shared establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed @demica/shared — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @demica/shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @demica/shared part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @demica/shared is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005010 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @demica/shared across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @demica/shared (version 99.99.100). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @demica/shared across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@demica/sharednpm

Malicious code in @demica/shared (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5351

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @demica/shared

What this malware does

Note: This report is updated by a verification record

Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/shared at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.

@demica/[email protected] declares postinstall: node canary.js postinstall in package.json, which fires automatically on npm install. canary.js issues a plaintext HTTP GET to bare IP 157.230.17.236:80 at path /dc?... with query parameters including os.hostname(), the package name/version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. The installer's host identifier is disclosed to a third-party endpoint over unauthenticated HTTP without consent. The package self-describes as a 'dependency-confusion canary' and uses an inflated version (99.99.100) under the @demica scope to outrank a presumed internal package of the same name — the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape. Regardless of the operator's stated intent, any party that resolves this public package on npm install is beaconed to an attacker-shaped destination (bare IP, plaintext HTTP, no opt-out).

Malicious versions

1 flagged

99.99.100

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

dfc020ab633bac129072df0d74deea8e0a2e118b43dbebf01ba9bbf2b13b6e76

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @demica/shared (version 99.99.100). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @demica/shared across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@demica/shared establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @demica/shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @demica/shared before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @demica/shared on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 99.99.100 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005010

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @demica/shared-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring