@demica/resourcesnpm
@demica/resources is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5350) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 99.99.99, 99.99.100). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @demica/resources (npm)
What this malware does
Note: This report is updated by a verification record
Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/resources at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.
On npm install, the package's scripts.postinstall executes canary.js, which issues an unconditional plain-HTTP GET to the hardcoded bare IP 157.230.17.236 on port 80 at path /dc?.... The query string includes os.hostname() (truncated to 200 chars) plus the package name, version, a nonce, and a phase identifier. This fires automatically on every install with no opt-out. The package self-describes as a 'dependency-confusion canary,' but it is published on the public npm registry under the @demica/* scope: any installer that resolves @demica/resources — including via accidental dependency confusion, typo, or curiosity install — will leak their hostname to the operator of that bare IP over unencrypted HTTP. The destination is an anonymous bare IP with no associated domain, publisher, or disclosure; hostname is an installer-side host identifier transmitted off-host to an attacker-shaped endpoint.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @demica/resources (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @demica/resources across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@demica/resources establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @demica/resources was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @demica/resources before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @demica/resources-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.