@demica/corenpm

Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/core at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized benign canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.

Package self-describes as a dependency-confusion canary targeting the @demica scope and ships a postinstall hook that fires automatically on npm install. package.json declares scripts.postinstall: node canary.js postinstall, and canary.js lines 18-22 issue an HTTP GET to the bare IP 157.230.17.236 on port 80 at path /dc?... with the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. Any machine that resolves @demica/[email protected] from the public registry — typically because an internal build accidentally pulled the public squat instead of the private @demica/core — silently announces itself to the operator of 157.230.17.236, disclosing the installer's egress IP, the presence of the @demica internal namespace in the build, and confirmation that the dependency-confusion attack succeeded. The beacon body is metadata-only (no env/filesystem/credential reads), but the install-time outbound HTTP to a hardcoded attacker-controlled bare IP, fired without consent on default install, is the canonical dependency-confusion exploitation primitive and gives the publisher exactly the reconnaissance signal needed to identify and escalate against vulnerable internal build pipelines.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.