@demica/corenpm
Malicious code in @demica/core (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/core at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized benign canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.
Package self-describes as a dependency-confusion canary targeting the @demica scope and ships a postinstall hook that fires automatically on npm install. package.json declares scripts.postinstall: node canary.js postinstall, and canary.js lines 18-22 issue an HTTP GET to the bare IP 157.230.17.236 on port 80 at path /dc?... with the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. Any machine that resolves @demica/[email protected] from the public registry — typically because an internal build accidentally pulled the public squat instead of the private @demica/core — silently announces itself to the operator of 157.230.17.236, disclosing the installer's egress IP, the presence of the @demica internal namespace in the build, and confirmation that the dependency-confusion attack succeeded. The beacon body is metadata-only (no env/filesystem/credential reads), but the install-time outbound HTTP to a hardcoded attacker-controlled bare IP, fired without consent on default install, is the canonical dependency-confusion exploitation primitive and gives the publisher exactly the reconnaissance signal needed to identify and escalate against vulnerable internal build pipelines.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @demica/core (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @demica/core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@demica/core is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @demica/core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @demica/core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @demica/core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.