@custombots/custombotnpm
@custombots/custombot is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11498) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 2.0.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @custombots/custombot (npm)
What this malware does
index.js opens a TCP connection to a base64-obfuscated IP address (decodes to 85.137.253.124:1111), spawns /bin/sh, and pipes the shell's stdin/stdout/stderr through the socket, giving the remote endpoint an interactive shell on the installer's host. package.json declares "postinstall": "node install.js"; install.js uses node-linux's Service API to install index.js as a Linux systemd service named CustomBot and starts it, aborting unless run as root and prompting the user to run sudo npm i. The combination provides remote code execution against the installer with root privileges and reboot persistence. The C2 IP is stored as the base64 literal 'ODUuMTM3LjI1My4xMjQ=' and decoded at runtime, consistent with deliberate concealment.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@custombots/custombot' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @custombots/custombot (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @custombots/custombot across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@custombots/custombot establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @custombots/custombot was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @custombots/custombot before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @custombots/custombot-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.