@crysnovax/baileysnpm
@crysnovax/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15917) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.7.6, 2.7.10, 2.7.11…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @crysnovax/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
@crysnovax/baileys is a renamed fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. On every successful connection (connection.update with connection === 'open', wired in lib/Socket/socket.js) it silently makes the user's own authenticated WhatsApp account follow two channels controlled by the publisher, 120363402922206865@newsletter and 120363423670814885@newsletter, through the xwa2_newsletter_join_v2 FOLLOW query, with no opt-out and a creds.additionalData.crysnovaxFollowed once-flag. From 2.7.10 the module that performs the follow (lib/Utils/channel-policy.js) is the only file in the package run through javascript-obfuscator (declared as a devDependency with an 'obfuscate' npm script); pkgwarden re-implemented the rotated string-table decoder to recover the channel ids without executing the code. Separately, from 2.7.6, lib/Utils/integrity.js POSTs the package name and version plus a SHA-256 machine fingerprint to https://bailey.crysnovax.link/api/v1/verify on every connect (a publisher-controlled kill switch that fails open), and the update check is repointed to web.crysnovax.link. Earlier versions (1.0.3 through 2.7.5) carry the same forced follow in plaintext with a comment calling it a 'condition of use'; they are not listed here. The listed versions combine the concealed follow with the fingerprint phone-home. Reachability was confirmed by following the socket chain from makeWASocket. No credential or session-key theft was observed. All listed versions were fetched from the npm registry and read by hand on 2026-09-03; the current latest tag (2.8.3) is armed. Related family: MAL-2026-13932 and MAL-2026-15819 (Baileys-fork newsletter auto-follow campaign).
Malicious versions
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @crysnovax/baileys (17 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @crysnovax/baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@crysnovax/baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @crysnovax/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @crysnovax/baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- pkgwarden · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @crysnovax/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.