@coze-common/chat-areanpm
Malicious code in @coze-common/chat-area (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package is a dependency-confusion/namespace-squat against ByteDance's @coze-common scope. The library is hollow — index.js is module.exports = {} and the description ('Browser accessibility and security utilities for React') does not match the package name. The harm runs at install time: package.json declares postinstall: node postinstall.js, and postinstall.js collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), and a recursive directory listing of the install working directory, base64-encodes the JSON payload, and POSTs it to https://wybqtvzmfhssbvhokfgbvgaalpfg1vneq.oast.fun/ via https.request. A DNS covert channel (dns.lookup of a hex-encoded hostname+username subdomain under the same oast.fun host) is used as fallback to bypass HTTP egress filters. oast.fun is Interactsh out-of-band infrastructure used for reconnaissance against the installer's machine; the version 99.1.1 is the shadowing pattern used to win dependency-confusion resolution against the legitimate private @coze-common scope.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @coze-common/chat-area (version 99.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @coze-common/chat-area across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @coze-common/chat-area from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @coze-common/chat-area was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @coze-common/chat-area before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @coze-common/chat-area-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.