@cloudplatform-single-spa/airflownpm
Malicious code in @cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Part of a dependency confusion attack campaign targeting the @cloudplatform-single-spa and @mlspace npm scopes. The attacker (npm user mr.4nd3r50n) published 139 scoped packages at the inflated version 99.99.99, which resolves ahead of any private registry version via npm's default version resolution, silently hijacking installs of internal packages.
On installation, the postinstall hook executes scripts/postinstall.js. The script waits 3 seconds (sandbox evasion), then downloads an OS-specific second-stage JavaScript payload from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{mac|win|linux}.js, writes it to a temporary file (._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js in the system temp directory), and spawns it as a detached Node.js process that continues running after npm exits. The payload exfiltrates the full process.env (environment variables including secrets, tokens, and credentials), along with hostname, username, platform, architecture, and working directory, to the C2 endpoint https://oob.moika.tech/report. If the second-stage download fails, a fallback beacon containing the same system details is sent to the same endpoint.
Malicious versions
Every published version of this package is considered malicious — remove it entirely.
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow (all published versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @cloudplatform-single-spa/airflow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.