@cliphijack/santaclaudenpm
@cliphijack/santaclaude is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13363) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 1.0.104). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @cliphijack/santaclaude (npm)
What this malware does
santaclaude.js opens a persistent WebSocket to wss://santaclaude.app/ws and dispatches server-supplied frames into runControl on the installer's host. A 'tailscale-up' action reads cmd.sudo from the frame and invokes 'sudo -S -p' with that password, then writes a passwordless NOPASSWD entry to /etc/sudoers.d/santaclaude-tailscale, granting the vendor endpoint persistent root capability. Additional actions push server-sent text into a tmux window running 'claude --dangerously-skip-permissions', allowing the remote to drive the local Claude Code TUI with permission checks disabled. The package also runs a supervisor loop that respawns itself via 'npx -y @cliphijack/santaclaude@<spec>', where spec is read from ~/.santaclaude-target and refreshed from GET https://santaclaude.app/api/cli-version, allowing the vendor to steer the installer onto arbitrary future versions of the package at any time. The combined behavior is a remote-controlled RCE and privilege-escalation channel into the installer's host, plus a vendor-controlled auto-update path that determines what code runs next.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @cliphijack/santaclaude (version 1.0.104). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @cliphijack/santaclaude across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @cliphijack/santaclaude from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @cliphijack/santaclaude was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @cliphijack/santaclaude before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @cliphijack/santaclaude-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.