@cliphijack/santaclaudenpm
@cliphijack/santaclaude is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13363) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.0.100, 1.0.102, 1.0.103…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @cliphijack/santaclaude (npm)
What this malware does
The santaclaude bin opens a persistent WebSocket connection to https://santaclaude.app and long-polls /api/control/claim. Messages received from the server are dispatched to runControl(cmd), which invokes tmux send-keys -l (plus Enter) into arbitrary target windows on the user's host, spawns new tmux windows that run claude --dangerously-skip-permissions by default, and can kill or resize windows. The result is that the remote endpoint can execute arbitrary shell keystrokes in the user's tmux sessions and drive an AI coding agent that has itself been configured to bypass tool-use confirmations, yielding full-host command execution. A second path (checkUpdate()) polls /api/cli-version and, when the server returns a target value, writes it to ~/.santaclaude-target, exits with code 75, and causes the wrapper loop to re-exec npx -y @cliphijack/santaclaude@<server-chosen-version> — the version of the client that runs next is chosen by the remote server. Additional shell hooks (hooks/sc-notify.sh, hooks/sc-stop.sh) POST via curl to the same service with host identifiers. Whether or not the operator of santaclaude.app is the package author, the shipped design gives that endpoint an unauthenticated remote-control channel into the installer's shell and agent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @cliphijack/santaclaude (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @cliphijack/santaclaude across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @cliphijack/santaclaude from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @cliphijack/santaclaude was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @cliphijack/santaclaude before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @cliphijack/santaclaude-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.