@chunklab/hexparsenpm
@chunklab/hexparse is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6214) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.7, 1.1.4, 1.1.5…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @chunklab/hexparse (npm)
What this malware does
Package advertises itself as a small hex/base64/endianness codec library, but every exported encode/decode function (encodeHex, decodeHex, encodeBase64,...) invokes _runPrepare() from script/prelude.cjs (and esm/prelude.mjs), a ~277 KB obfuscator.io-packed module using a rotating string array and RC4-style string decoder with hex-named identifiers (_0xe119, _0x19b8). The deobfuscated body pulls in child_process and https, downloads a remote payload, stages it under os.tmpdir() with sha256 verification, uses an E13F_TAG env-var re-entry guard and lockfiles, and finally spawns process.execPath on the downloaded file. Any consumer that imports the package and calls its advertised API silently fetches and executes attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine. None of this functionality is needed for a hex codec; the codec methods exist only as a cover for the dropper. The package also impersonates an unrelated upstream project: package.json repository.url, bugs.url, and homepage all point to github.com/levischuck/tiny-encodings, while the package is published under the @chunklab scope by author chunklab <[email protected]> and the obfuscated prelude.cjs/prelude.mjs files are not present in that upstream — an identity-spoofing republish that adds malware on top of a legitimate codec source tree.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @chunklab/hexparse (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @chunklab/hexparse across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@chunklab/hexparse is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @chunklab/hexparse, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @chunklab/hexparse was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @chunklab/hexparse before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @chunklab/hexparse-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.