@ceeferenderer/itg-renderer-sdknpm

Malicious package due to code obfuscation, dynamic module loading, process exposure, suspicious install script, and untrustworthy author email.

This package performs silent reconnaissance against any machine that installs or requires it. The package.json declares scripts.install = node index.js, and index.js also loads lib/core.js at require() time. lib/core.js obtains the os and dns modules via module.constructor._load(...) — a deliberate bypass of simple require('os')/require('dns') source grep — then reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and path.basename(process.cwd()), concatenates them with a timestamp and the hard-coded domain oob.sl4x0.xyz, and calls dns.resolve4() on the resulting subdomain. Because oob.sl4x0.xyz is an attacker-controlled authoritative nameserver, the victim's resolver leaks the username, hostname, and working-directory name as DNS query labels. The sensitive identifiers and the domain itself are stored as hex byte arrays in lib/6ad264.js and lib/b02e30.js and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode, and the JS filenames are random hex — clear evasion of static review. Supporting red flags: the author email is [email protected] (same attacker-owned domain), the version is 99.9.9, and the package description is generic. This is active exfiltration of installer-side data executed on both install and import, with no legitimate functionality documented.