@ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64npm
@ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12084) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 0.1.20). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 (npm)
What this malware does
The tarball's sole payload is a macOS/arm64 Go executable (under bin/) that opens a WebSocket connection to a hardcoded remote server (strings include ws://ccfly and wss:// endpoints plus a /rescue/status?session=...&agent=... path) and pipes received messages into a PTY-attached local shell built from github.com/creack/pty, github.com/gorilla/websocket, and os/exec. Chinese-language pairing/approval prompts embedded in the binary describe enrolling the host so that it can be remotely controlled from a web or phone client to drive 'Claude Code'; the binary also writes to ~/.zshrc and ~/.bash_profile for shell persistence and references anthropic.com / ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS. package.json declares no scripts, main, or bin, so installing this platform-specific sub-package alone does not auto-execute code; it acts as the carrier that places the agent on disk for a parent @ccfly/setup CLI to launch. Once the agent runs and a remote party completes pairing, that party obtains an interactive shell on the installer's macOS host, which is a remote-access backdoor regardless of the advertised remote-control-for-Claude-Code framing.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 (version 0.1.20). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ccfly/setup-darwin-arm64-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.