@card-pci-data/storenpm
Malicious code in @card-pci-data/store (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's preinstall hook (scripts.preinstall: node index.js || true) runs index.js which collects host identity — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, __dirname, and process.cwd() — and exfiltrates it through two channels: (1) an HTTP POST to the hardcoded bare IP 172.201.213.59:9090/c, and (2) a DNS resolution of a hex-encoded label appended to *.d8jbmnsqcfu78dfs8vdg34ohqhirb4pbg.oast.live (an interactsh-style out-of-band beacon). The package has no advertised functionality beyond this beacon; its description is security research and the scoped name @card-pci-data/store impersonates payment-card / PCI-related tooling, consistent with a dependency-confusion or namespace-abuse lure. This auto-executes on default install and produces clear attacker benefit (installer host fingerprint delivered to attacker-controlled infrastructure).
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @card-pci-data/store (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @card-pci-data/store across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@card-pci-data/store is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @card-pci-data/store was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @card-pci-data/store before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @card-pci-data/store-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.