@car_loans/dealerships-approvalnpm
Malicious code in @car_loans/dealerships-approval (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@car_loans/dealerships-approval 7.1.5 self-describes as a 'browserslist config' but ships a heavily obfuscated postinstall dropper. package.json declares "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js"; that script uses a rotating string-array + RC4 decoder plus byte-array-to-String.fromCharCode wrappers to hide every module name, method, and URL fragment. On npm install, the script HTTPS-GETs a remote payload assembled from base64 fragments, RC4-decrypts the response, writes it to disk, chmods 0o755, and spawns it detached with stdio:'ignore' and unref() — attacker-controlled code executed on the installer's machine with no user interaction. Before and after payload execution, it collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, platform, arch, package name/version, and an event tag and POSTs them to a base64-assembled remote host; it also encodes fingerprint data into <hex>.<rand>.<host> subdomain labels and calls dns.resolve4 as a DNS-tunnel side channel intended to bypass HTTP egress filtering. The package additionally exhibits the classic dependency-confusion shape: an unusual underscore scope @car_loans/*, README that labels it an 'Internal package — Platform Engineering Team', and homepage/repository/registry URLs on the non-existent car-loans.io domain instructing consumers to point .npmrc at https://npm.car-loans.io. Any developer at a targeted organization who resolves this name from the public registry receives immediate install-time code execution and host fingerprint exfiltration.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @car_loans/dealerships-approval (version 7.1.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @car_loans/dealerships-approval across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@car_loans/dealerships-approval is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @car_loans/dealerships-approval was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @car_loans/dealerships-approval before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @car_loans/dealerships-approval-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.