@brick-v2/formnpm
Advisory published Updated
@brick-v2/form is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17716) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 999.0.1, 999.0.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @brick-v2/form (npm)
What this malware does
@brick-v2/form is a dependency confusion package published to npm on 2026-10-09 by the account s4yhii__, targeting the internal @galicia-toolkit-* / @brick-v2 package namespaces with inflated versions (e.g. 999.0.x). Early versions resolve <hostname>.<tag>.dc.oob.s4yhii.com via DNS to beacon the victim's hostname. Later versions run node index.js from a preinstall hook, which loads a bundled native addon (prebuilds/<platform>-<arch>/metrics.node, Linux and Windows builds). The addon forks a detached process that collects hostname, username, OS/arch, cwd and the full values of CI/cloud secrets from environment variables (NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, SYSTEM_ACCESSTOKEN, AZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT and others) and sends them as JSON via HTTP POST /native to oob.s4yhii.com:9999.
The package ships a tiny JavaScript stub at index.js that silently require()s a compiled native addon at prebuilds/linux-x64/metrics.node inside a try/catch that suppresses errors. On load, the addon reads a hardcoded list of credential-bearing environment variables (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS session token, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN, SYSTEM_ACCESSTOKEN) along with hostname, user, cwd, and OS/arch, and sends them as a JSON body via a raw TCP socket (gethostbyname/socket/connect/send) in a 'POST /native HTTP/1.0' request to the hardcoded external host oob.s4yhii.com. The addon also imports fork and setsid, consistent with detaching into a background process so the exfiltration channel survives beyond the host Node process. The compiled ELF is the entire payload; the JS wrapper exposes no form-related functionality matching the stated 'form module' description. The package manifest (scoped name @brick-v2/form, inflated version 999.0.1, UNLICENSED, minimal metadata) matches the dependency-confusion shape used to outrank an internal private-registry package of the same scope.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @brick-v2/form (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@brick-v2/form is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @brick-v2/form was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @brick-v2/form-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.