@bellaxchuu/teambailsnpm
Advisory published Updated
@bellaxchuu/teambails is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17348) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.1.4, 1.1.6, 1.1.8…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @bellaxchuu/teambails (npm)
What this malware does
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: @bellaxchuu/teambails (npm), version(s): 1.1.9, 1.1.8, 1.1.6, 1.1.4, 1.2.4.
package.json declares the libsignal dependency as github:Bellaxata/libsignal-node with no commit SHA, tag, or branch pin. On npm install, npm resolves the current HEAD of that repository's default branch and installs its contents into node_modules, running any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare) present in the fetched tree. The resolved bytes are whatever the repository owner pushes at install time, delivered with no version pin and no integrity check. The GitHub account hosting the dependency is separate from the npm publishing scope, and the source is not the npm registry. A minor static match on lib/Utils/generics.js line 403 (ping) appears in ordinary utility code and is not independently indicative of malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @bellaxchuu/teambails (5 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@bellaxchuu/teambails is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @bellaxchuu/teambails was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OX Security · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @bellaxchuu/teambails-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.