@bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-webnpm
Malicious code in @bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares scripts.postinstall: node./callback.js, which fires automatically on npm install. callback.js reads the installer's hostname and transmits it to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator domain (3y294ed4dfq501wnmdvbakcnwe25qvek.oastify.com) via two channels: an HTTPS GET to /<token>/<encodeURIComponent(host)> and a DNS lookup against a subdomain encoding the same token + hostname. The package self-describes as an "authorized security research PoC" but is published under the @bancolonbia scope (a likely typosquat of the Bancolombia corporate namespace), matching the classic dependency-confusion shape: a private-looking scoped name registered publicly so a misconfigured internal build resolves to this package and beacons victim identity to the researcher/attacker. Whether or not the operator is authorized by Bancolombia, any third party who installs this package has their hostname exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled Collaborator endpoint without consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web' @ 0.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @bancolonbia/menu-filter-widget-web-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.