@bananacool467/ui-toolsnpm
@bananacool467/ui-tools is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13416) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.0-beta, 0.1.1-beta, 0.1.2-beta…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @bananacool467/ui-tools (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a UI-components library (README compares it to MUI), but its main export surface includes useTerminal, a server-side middleware that stands up a WebSocketServer (default path /terminal-stream) and, on every incoming WS message, spawns an interactive bash/powershell PTY via pty.spawn with the server process's own environment ({...process.env, TERM: 'xterm-256color'}) and cwd set to the user's home directory. Bytes received from the WebSocket are written directly into the PTY (session.ptyProcess.write(parsed.data), with a fallback that writes raw message bytes), and PTY output is streamed back to the socket. No authentication, origin check, or handshake token gates the connection. dist/terminal.js ships the matching browser client (exported as Terminal) that connects to that same WebSocket and pipes keystrokes as {type:'input', data:...}, so the package ships both ends of a remote-shell channel. A consumer who mounts the exported hook — expecting a UI helper — exposes a full unauthenticated interactive shell on their server, executing as the server process. The mismatch between the marketed purpose (UI kit) and the shipped capability (network-driven RCE) is the shape of a backdoor delivered under a benign cover story.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @bananacool467/ui-tools (8 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @bananacool467/ui-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@bananacool467/ui-tools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @bananacool467/ui-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @bananacool467/ui-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @bananacool467/ui-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.