Which versions of @baanx/solana-lib are malicious?

The following npm versions of @baanx/solana-lib are flagged malicious: 9.9.10. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @baanx/solana-lib if I installed it?

@baanx/solana-lib establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed @baanx/solana-lib — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @baanx/solana-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @baanx/solana-lib part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @baanx/solana-lib is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-020204 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @baanx/solana-lib across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @baanx/solana-lib (version 9.9.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @baanx/solana-lib across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@baanx/solana-libnpm

@baanx/solana-lib is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16300) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 9.9.10). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @baanx/solana-lib (npm)

MAL-2026-16300

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @baanx/solana-lib

What this malware does

The package declares scripts.install = node index.js, so npm install @baanx/solana-lib automatically executes index.js, which loads lib/core.js. That module reads the installer's username (os.userInfo().username), hostname (os.hostname()), and current working directory basename, concatenates them with a timestamp and the static prefix bxsol, and issues a dns.resolve4() lookup against <prefix>.<user>.<host>.<cwd>.<ts>.oob.algamil7x.xyz — a DNS-based out-of-band beacon that leaks installer identity to a hardcoded non-first-party domain. Helper modules lib/e5f0a2.js and lib/f6a1b3.js reconstruct the strings os, dns, userInfo, hostname, cwd, resolve4, the prefix bxsol, and the destination host oob.algamil7x.xyz from String.fromCharCode byte arrays, and load Node builtins indirectly via module.constructor._load('os') / _load('dns') to conceal the behavior. The package is presented as a Solana library; the char-code-obfuscated destination and the install-time host-recon beacon are inconsistent with any legitimate Solana functionality.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

9.9.10

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6462ecac2764fc9cf78d47ee57fec1fd3d6a0cf573ee02eaddcc2e5b5f3f0d7e

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @baanx/solana-lib (version 9.9.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @baanx/solana-lib across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@baanx/solana-lib establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @baanx/solana-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @baanx/solana-lib before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @baanx/solana-lib on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 9.9.10 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-020204

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @baanx/solana-lib-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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