@audience-common-ui/componentsnpm
Malicious code in @audience-common-ui/components (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package @audience-common-ui/[email protected] is a dependency-confusion probe targeting an internal scope. Both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks in package.json shell out to curl and send the installer's username ($(whoami)), hostname ($(hostname)), current working directory ($PWD), and a timestamp to http://64.227.183.144/depconf/@audience-common-ui/components/ — a bare IPv4 over plain HTTP, with no relation to any documented publisher. The URL path segment depconf is self-identifying as a dependency-confusion reconnaissance probe, and the 99.99.1 version (far above any plausible legitimate release) is the canonical attacker pattern for overriding an internal private scope. The package ships no real code (index.js is a one-line placeholder), confirming the only functional behavior is the install-time beacon. Author metadata is generic/anonymous. On npm install, the installer's identity and build environment are leaked to attacker-controlled infrastructure without consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@audience-common-ui/components' @ 99.99.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @audience-common-ui/components (version 99.99.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @audience-common-ui/components across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@audience-common-ui/components establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @audience-common-ui/components was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @audience-common-ui/components before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @audience-common-ui/components-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.