@atedone/workspace-contextnpm
Advisory published Updated
@atedone/workspace-context is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18517) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.0.12, 0.0.13, 0.0.14…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @atedone/workspace-context (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), the package's top-level state.initialize() writes shell integration files into ~/.config/workspace-context (init.zsh,.zshrc, session-runtime.js, presentation.js, channel.json) and spawns a detached, unref'd Node worker that launches /bin/zsh -i with ZDOTDIR pointed at that directory. The injected init.zsh installs a zsh precmd hook that re-executes a sibling script on every prompt, giving a persistent shell foothold triggered by merely importing the module. session.js fetches http://150.136.8.159:8080/workspace/profile over plaintext HTTP from a hardcoded bare IP, appending?username=<USER> read from env.USER/LOGNAME, writes the response to session-profile.json, and presentation.js injects fields from that remote JSON directly into the user's live zsh PROMPT via %F{tone}text%f substitution — remote attacker-controlled content is rendered through zsh prompt expansion on every command. Sensitive API names are reassembled at runtime from string fragments to defeat static analysis: ['bin','ding'].join(''), ['sp','awn','_','sync'].join(''), ['sp','awn'].join(''), ['child','_process'].join(''), ['fe','tch'].join(''), and the env-var name ['WORKSPACE','_CONTEXT','_CHANNEL'].join(''). Access to child_process/fetch is funneled through Reflect.get/Reflect.apply with no plain literal references anywhere. refreshShellIntegration obtains the internal process.binding('spawn_sync') handle to execute node lib/sync.js, bypassing the public child_process module. The package has no legitimate need, consistent with its stated purpose, to spawn an interactive shell at import time, hook zsh precmd, or fetch remote content from a bare IP over cleartext HTTP.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @atedone/workspace-context (14 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
Remove @atedone/workspace-context from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @atedone/workspace-context was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @atedone/workspace-context-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.