@asyncapi/specsnpm
@asyncapi/specs is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2025-190643) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.9.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @asyncapi/specs (npm)
What this malware does
@asyncapi/specs versions 6.11.2-alpha.1 and 6.11.2 were published as part of the "Miasma RAT" software supply-chain attack (campaign identifier "miasma-train-p1") that compromised several widely used @asyncapi npm packages on 2026-07-14. Unlike the whitespace-hiding technique used in the compromised generator packages, here the attacker prepended the malicious code directly to the top of index.js. When the package is installed, the injected code spawns a child process that downloads the Miasma RAT binary from IPFS (https://ipfs.io/ipfs/Qmet4fhsAaWMBUxNDfREHwgiyDeSWy4YSYs9wiKUW5jGyf), writes it to a platform-specific drop location, and executes it. Persistence is established by dropping a backdoor named sync.js (~/.local/share/NodeJS/sync.js on Linux, ~/Library/Application Support/NodeJS/sync.js on macOS, %LOCALAPPDATA%\NodeJS\sync.js on Windows). The Miasma RAT harvests browser credentials, SSH keys, npm tokens, GitHub CLI credentials, AWS secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets, and communicates with a command-and-control server at 85.137.53.71 (AS43641, Netherlands). The attacker also embedded an Ethereum smart-contract address (0x12c37A86a0Ed0beBe5d1d6a43E42f07860eAc710), suggesting on-chain command routing or exfiltration. The last known safe version is 6.11.1.
index.js in @asyncapi/specs 6.11.2 contains a string-array-obfuscated payload (_0x-style decoder) that, whenever the module is required, spawns a detached node child process. The decoded logic fetches a file from the IPFS gateway URL https://ipfs.io/ipfs/Qmet4fhsAaWMBUxNDfREHwgiyDeSWy4YSYs9wiKUW5jGyf, writes it as sync.js under a platform-specific hidden directory (LOCALAPPDATA/NodeJS on Windows, ~/Library/Application Support/NodeJS on macOS, ~/.local/share/NodeJS on Linux), and executes it detached via node. The obfuscation hides the URL, target filename, and use of https, child_process, and fs APIs. A legitimate AsyncAPI JSON spec loader has no need for obfuscated code or remote code fetch-and-execute; the behavior is inconsistent with the package's advertised purpose and gives whoever controls the IPFS content full code execution on any machine that installs or loads this version.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
This package was compromised by the Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming NPM worm. The malicious payload steals tokens and credentials and publishes them to GitHub. The worm will propogate itself to NPM packages the user owns and establish persistence is a GitHub action. The package may also destroy the user's home directory.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @asyncapi/specs (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @asyncapi/specs across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@asyncapi/specs is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @asyncapi/specs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @asyncapi/specs before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @asyncapi/specs-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.