Which versions of @asyncapi/generator-components are malicious?

The following npm versions of @asyncapi/generator-components are flagged malicious: 0.3.2, 0.3.3, 0.7.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @asyncapi/generator-components if I installed it?

@asyncapi/generator-components is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @asyncapi/generator-components — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @asyncapi/generator-components was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @asyncapi/generator-components part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @asyncapi/generator-components is associated with the GHSA-m6ch-4fxh-v72c, IN-MAL-2026-010506 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @asyncapi/generator-components across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @asyncapi/generator-components (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @asyncapi/generator-components across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@asyncapi/generator-componentsnpm

@asyncapi/generator-components is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2025-190656) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.3.2, 0.3.3, 0.7.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @asyncapi/generator-components (npm)

MAL-2025-190656

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @asyncapi/generator-components

What this malware does

@asyncapi/generator-components version 0.7.1 was published as part of the "Miasma RAT" software supply-chain attack (campaign identifier "miasma-train-p1") that compromised several widely used @asyncapi npm packages on 2026-07-14. The malicious code was injected using whitespace hiding: it is appended to a legitimate source file after hundreds of trailing spaces on the file's final line, so it is not visible in a casual diff. When the package is installed, the injected code spawns a child process that downloads the Miasma RAT binary from IPFS (https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmQobZSp1wRPrpSEQ56qnyq7ecZh5Bg5k1fnjt4SUwwHb9), writes it to a platform-specific drop location, and executes it. Persistence is established by dropping a backdoor named sync.js (~/.local/share/NodeJS/sync.js on Linux, ~/Library/Application Support/NodeJS/sync.js on macOS, %LOCALAPPDATA%\NodeJS\sync.js on Windows). The Miasma RAT harvests browser credentials, SSH keys, npm tokens, GitHub CLI credentials, AWS secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets, and communicates with a command-and-control server at 85.137.53.71 (AS43641, Netherlands). The attacker also embedded an Ethereum smart-contract address (0x12c37A86a0Ed0beBe5d1d6a43E42f07860eAc710), suggesting on-chain command routing or exfiltration. The last known safe version is 0.7.0.

lib/utils/ErrorHandling.js contains an obfuscator.io string-array with a base64+decodeURIComponent decoder colocated with a top-level main() invocation reachable via the package's main entry (lib/index.js -> components/HandleError.js -> utils/ErrorHandling.js). On require of the package, main() spawns a detached, stdio-ignored Node subprocess via spawn('node', ['-e', <decoded-payload>], { detached: true, stdio: [...], windowsHide: true }).unref(), where the '-e' argument is ~3 KB of code decoded at runtime from a base64 blob in the obfuscated string array. The payload delivery mechanism (heavy obfuscation, runtime string decoding, detached backgrounded child process, hidden window on Windows) is inconsistent with any documented error-handling functionality and matches the shape of a hidden load-time RCE injection into a legitimate AsyncAPI package.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

This package was compromised by the Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming NPM worm. The malicious payload steals tokens and credentials and publishes them to GitHub. The worm will propogate itself to NPM packages the user owns and establish persistence is a GitHub action. The package may also destroy the user's home directory.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

0.3.20.3.30.7.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f8979c7e0c324a5176bad2972f76ef64aaea7afdbbe7f728586c94682bd0d1ad

5719055be86fb9260cf6b5973a434e721bdd9be14f737de6cbd7ebddac9292ba

3d8870842b3d0e51c4a8e1b27c36bd1800f1fe22cafbaa9caea87b9ddfdf497d

f627fc2ccd3242571f3bc5f3872bef674cde6c2539401724b25294592da5c2a9

53b011ee7d312f04a975987c919c0b2682df7e875bffceef2d932027e08a2f2a

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @asyncapi/generator-components (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @asyncapi/generator-components across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@asyncapi/generator-components is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @asyncapi/generator-components was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @asyncapi/generator-components before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @asyncapi/generator-components on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.3.2, 0.3.3, 0.7.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-m6ch-4fxh-v72cIN-MAL-2026-010506

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @asyncapi/generator-components-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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