@asyncapi/generatornpm
@asyncapi/generator is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2025-190636) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.8.5, 2.8.6, 3.3.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @asyncapi/generator (npm)
What this malware does
@asyncapi/generator version 3.3.1 was published as part of the "Miasma RAT" software supply-chain attack (campaign identifier "miasma-train-p1") that compromised several widely used @asyncapi npm packages on 2026-07-14. The malicious code was injected using whitespace hiding: it is appended to a legitimate source file after hundreds of trailing spaces on the file's final line, so it is not visible in a casual diff. The malicious commit 3eab3ec9304aa26081358330491d3cfeb55cc245 was pushed to the generator repository's next branch. When the package is installed, the injected code spawns a child process that downloads the Miasma RAT binary from IPFS (https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmQobZSp1wRPrpSEQ56qnyq7ecZh5Bg5k1fnjt4SUwwHb9), writes it to a platform-specific drop location, and executes it. Persistence is established by dropping a backdoor named sync.js (~/.local/share/NodeJS/sync.js on Linux, ~/Library/Application Support/NodeJS/sync.js on macOS, %LOCALAPPDATA%\NodeJS\sync.js on Windows). The Miasma RAT harvests browser credentials, SSH keys, npm tokens, GitHub CLI credentials, AWS secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets, and communicates with a command-and-control server at 85.137.53.71 (AS43641, Netherlands). The attacker also embedded an Ethereum smart-contract address (0x12c37A86a0Ed0beBe5d1d6a43E42f07860eAc710), suggesting on-chain command routing or exfiltration. The last known safe version is 3.3.0.
lib/templates/config/validator.js contains a javascript-obfuscator string-array block (variables _0x1dd48b/_0x2d89, base64+URI-decode decoder with rotation) injected between legitimate functions. The block requires fs, path, https, child_process.spawn, and os, and invokes a top-level main() that calls spawn(<decoded-node-binary>, ['-e', <decoded-payload>], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true}).unref(). The -e argument is a ~4KB base64-encoded JavaScript body reconstructed from the obfuscated string array. The command name, -e flag, stdio value, and payload are all hidden behind the string-array decoder. Because validator.js is reachable via require() in this widely-used generator, loading the module launches a hidden, detached Node child process running attacker-supplied code with fs/https/os capabilities on the installer's machine. The obfuscation, mismatch with the file's declared validator purpose, and injection between existing functions are inconsistent with a legitimate maintainer change and match a compromised-release pattern.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
This package was compromised by the Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming NPM worm. The malicious payload steals tokens and credentials and publishes them to GitHub. The worm will propogate itself to NPM packages the user owns and establish persistence is a GitHub action. The package may also destroy the user's home directory.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @asyncapi/generator (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @asyncapi/generator across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@asyncapi/generator is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @asyncapi/generator was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @asyncapi/generator before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @asyncapi/generator-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.